Switzerland

TOBACCO INDUSTRY INTERFERENCE INDEX 2025

Date of Publication: (November 2025)

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Acknowledgements:
The authors would like to thank the following experts for their contributions to this report:
Markus Ossola, Swiss Cancer League (Krebsliga Schweiz)
Claudia Künzli, Swiss Lung Association (Lungenliga Schweiz)
Tania Séverin, Addiction Suisse
Philipp Tinguely, Swiss Heart Foundation
Julie Martin, Jérémy Cros and Luc Lebon, University Center for Primary Care and Public Health (Unisanté)
Evelyne Laszlo, CIPRET tobacco prevention Geneva
Hugo Molineaux, OxySuisse
Markus Dick and Martin Bienlein, stop2drop
Fabian Strässle, Lobbywatch

Without the input of all these people, this document would not be a reality.

The authors would also like to express sincere gratitude to Mary Assunta of the Global Centre for Good Governance in Tobacco Control (GGTC) for her editorial advice.

Suggested citation: Schürch, More Boffi, Posoch-Gueneau de Mussy and Ruggia (2025). Switzerland Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2025. Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control (GGTC) & Swiss Association for Tobacco Control. Nov 2025.

Endorsements (if any):

Swiss association for tobacco control

krebsliga schweiz
ligue suisse contre le cancer
lega svizzera contro il cancro

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Fondation Suisse de Cardiologie

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Foreword

Switzerland is internationally regarded as a country of responsibility, neutrality, and a high quality of life. All the more striking, then, is the contradiction that our country lags far behind when it comes to tobacco control.

The *Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2025* once again confirms the extraordinarily strong influence of the tobacco and nicotine industry on politics and public administration in Switzerland. While numerous countries are taking consistent measures to curb this power, Switzerland remains one of the few nations where the industry can operate virtually unchecked.

A key reason for this is the non-ratification of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This convention would have established clear rules against lobbying, non-transparent and unrecorded meetings, and problematic partnerships. Instead, the corporations continue to enjoy broad freedom of action, often to the detriment of the population and their health.

The consequences are serious: tobacco use still causes around 14 percent of all deaths in our country. At the same time, the industry manages to conceal its destructive role through marketing, influence over research, and so-called sustainability projects. Health and responsibility play no part in this; it is solely about profit.

This report is therefore not just an overview, but a pressing call to action:

- Switzerland must ratify the WHO Framework Convention.
- Cooperation with the tobacco and nicotine industry must be strictly prohibited.

Only through clear and consistent action can we effectively protect public health and fulfil our responsibility to the people of this country.

Let us not allow Switzerland to continue being seen as a "playground" for an industry whose business model is built on addiction, illness, and death. Let us work together to ensure that health, the environment, and the core values of our country take priority and are no longer sacrificed to the interests of multinational corporations.

Warm regards,

Laurence Fehlmann Rielle
President, Swiss Association for Tobacco Prevention
Member of the National Council (SP)

Executive Summary

This report presents the 2025 Swiss country findings for the Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index (GTI), which evaluates how successfully governments protect public health policy from tobacco industry influence. Switzerland remains one of the worst-performing countries globally, scoring **96 out of 100**, reflecting widespread and persistent industry interference. This assessment covers developments between March 2023 and March 2025.

Switzerland faces a major public health challenge from tobacco use, yet industry interference continues to obstruct effective regulation. The country's failure to ratify the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has left it highly exposed to tobacco industry tactics. Major transnational companies (Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco International, British American Tobacco) are headquartered or operate here and enjoy unprecedented political access.

Key Findings

1 INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Switzerland has no barriers preventing tobacco industry actors from influencing public health policymaking. Parliamentarians openly represent tobacco interests, lobbyists are granted direct access to federal buildings, and industry-linked individuals occupy influential political positions. The industry also participates in official consultations and informal processes, sometimes even drafting policy language adopted by authorities. This has allowed the industry to directly influence legislation, watering down and stifling tobacco control measures.

2 INDUSTRY CSR ACTIVITIES

The government continues to endorse and participate in industry-led "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) activities. Japan Tobacco International (JTI) partners with public cultural institutions and the Federal Office for the Environment are involved in directly collaborating on clean-up campaigns with the industry. Federal Councilor Ignazio Cassis is listed as a speaker for a forum which lists JTI as a premium partner. These partnerships help the industry wash its image while maintaining influence.

3 BENEFITS TO THE INDUSTRY

(Summarize your evidence/ points in questions 6-7)

The government grants substantial subsidies to domestic tobacco growers (CHF 40,000 per hectare)[1], and major tobacco firms benefit from opaque tax

[1] Around 50,000 USD per hectare (exchange rate July 2025)

arrangements. Public pension funds remain invested in tobacco stocks, despite ethical concerns and public pressure to divest.

4 UNNECESSARY INTERACTION

High-level officials routinely meet with tobacco companies at social and lobbying events, many undisclosed. Examples include recurring closed-door meetings between Neuchâtel's government and PMI, and informal gatherings sponsored by industry-linked associations like Economiesuisse, or KS/CS. Persistent interactions between government officials and the tobacco industry foster close-knit relationships, normalising the industry's presence in political networks.

5 TRANSPARENCY

There is no obligation for government officials or parliamentarians to proactively disclose meetings with tobacco companies. Transparency rules are weak, inconsistently applied, and largely based on voluntary self-reporting. A lack of transparency requirements thus obscures government-tobacco industry relationships, creating opportunities for undisclosed collaborations.

6 CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Switzerland permits tobacco industry donations to political parties and campaign financing, with only minimal disclosure. In 2023, PMI directly contributed to the campaigns of both the political parties SVP (Swiss Peoples Party) and FDP (Swiss Radical Liberal Party). The country also lacks safeguards against the "revolving door" between government and industry. The absence of national regulations that prevent such conflict of interest enables complex and often concealed connections between the industry and Swiss politicians.

7 PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Switzerland has not implemented any specific Article 5.3 safeguards. There is no code of conduct for officials, no requirement for tobacco industry transparency, and no programmes to raise awareness of FCTC principles within government agencies. While some rules prohibit federal staff from accepting gifts over CHF 200, these do not apply to legislators.

Conclusion

Switzerland continues to provide the tobacco industry with access to political power. The absence of strong preventive measures, transparency, and conflict-of-interest safeguards allows the industry to shape laws and undermine public health. Without meaningful reform and the ratification of the WHO FCTC, Switzerland will remain a safe haven for tobacco industry interference. Urgent political will is needed to close these loopholes and prioritise public health over commercial interests.

Recommendations

As acknowledged by the United Nations General Assembly and the WHO FCTC, the Swiss government must recognise the fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between public health and the production, marketing and sale of tobacco products. To that end, the report offers actionable recommendations that must be adopted to address the health and environmental implications of tobacco. These involve:

1. Limit interactions between members of parliament or government, or administration and the tobacco industry.
2. Enforce transparent disclosure of all interactions by government, administration and members of parliament with the industry.
3. Remove economic and fiscal incentives for the tobacco industry.
4. Exclude the tobacco industry as much as possible from public health policy development as well as environmental policy.
5. Ratification of the FCTC

Switzerland as a whole will have to implement a comprehensive national tobacco control strategy aligned with the WHO FCTC. Support of NGO's and projects that ensure FCTC ratification to shift the status quo will be crucial, as will the continued collaboration between civil society, public health organisations and the government.

Abbreviations

AT Switzerland	Swiss Association for Tobacco Control
BAT	British American Tobacco
COP	Conference of the Parties, governing body of the WHO FCTC
CSR	corporate social responsibility
EPFL	Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne
FDF	Federal Department of Finance
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
FDP/PLR	Swiss Radical Liberal Party
FOCBS	Federal Office for Customs and Border Security
FOEN	Federal Office for the Environment
FOPH	Federal Office of Public Health
IGSU	Association for a Clean Environment and a Better Quality of Life (Interessengemeinschaft für eine saubere Umwelt und für mehr Lebensqualität)
JTI	Japan Tobacco International
KS/CS	Kommunikation Schweiz/Communication Suisse
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OASI	Old age and survivors' insurance
PMI	Philip Morris International
SGV/USAM	Swiss Trade Association (Schweizerischen Gewerbeverbandes SGV/Union des arts et métiers USAM)
SOTA	Cooperative Society for the Purchase of Indigenous Tobacco (Einkaufsgenossenschaft für Inlandtabak)
SVP/UDC	Swiss People’s Party
WHO	World Health Organization
WHO FCTC	World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

Background and Introduction

Switzerland is grappling with a substantial public health challenge due to tobacco use, which is responsible for a significant number of deaths each year. Data from 2021 showed that tobacco-related diseases cause approximately 10,000 deaths each year; a staggering figure that translates to over 27 deaths every day and accounts for 14% of all deaths in the country. Despite a decline from 30% in 2000, Switzerland's smoking prevalence remains alarmingly high with one in four adults in 2022 being smokers. This corresponds to more than 2 million active smokers, with notably high rates among both men (27.8%) and women (22.5%). Despite overwhelming scientific consensus on tobacco's health harms, the industry continues to derail public health policies and aggressively markets heated tobacco products, e-cigarettes and oral products under the guise of harm reduction, innovation and consumer choice.

The Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index (Global Tobacco Index) report plays a crucial role in shedding light on the tobacco control landscape in Switzerland, revealing the complex influence of the tobacco industry on policy-making. Switzerland's ranking of 79th out of 80 countries in the 2021 Global Tobacco Index report, and 89th out of 90 countries in 2023 alarmed the public and media alike. Exposing tobacco industry strategies that further its agenda, such as buying science, co-opting federal authorities into industry CSR activities, and leveraging an extensive political network have raised awareness about the country's vulnerability to tobacco and e-cigarette industry influence. This influence is magnified by Switzerland's failure to ratify the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). In Switzerland, the tobacco industry has found a safe haven. Switzerland hosts the global headquarters of Philip Morris International (PMI) and the regional hub of Japan Tobacco International (JTI). PMI operates both a research centre and a factory in Neuchâtel, while JTI runs a factory in Dagmersellen. Additionally, British American Tobacco (BAT) holds offices for the Swiss market in the city of Lausanne, and up to 2023 ran a factory in Boncourt. Due to Switzerland's lax lobbying rules and a political environment that favours industry interests, these corporations operate with unparalleled access to decision-makers. Since Switzerland's disappointing performance in the 2021 edition of the Global Tobacco Index - where it also ranked second to last - these issues have remained largely unchanged. Our current status quo has been the result of the critical twists and turns of the tobacco industry in Switzerland.

The industry has successfully embedded itself within Swiss policy-making circles, effectively blurring the lines between regulator and regulated. It is no accident that, 20 years after committing to the WHO FCTC, Switzerland has yet to ratify it. It is largely the result of strategic obstruction by the tobacco industry.

This country report for the 2025 edition of the Global Tobacco Index continues to show how deeply the tobacco lobby remains rooted in the Swiss political system. The tobacco industry has long understood that regulation threatens its business model. That's why its playbook includes shaping laws before they're drafted, participating in advisory roles, and presenting itself as a partner in health policy. But this is not a partnership. It is interference.

Cigarettes kill when used as intended. Thus, we again quote WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who rightly said:

"If tobacco was a virus, it would long ago have been called a pandemic."

The difference is: this pandemic is manufactured, marketed, and politically defended. It's time to end that defense.

Methodology

The report is based on a questionnaire developed by the Southeast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance. There are 20 questions based on the Article 5.3 guidelines. Information used in this report is obtained from the public domain only. A scoring system is applied to make the assessment. The score ranges from **0 to 5**, where 5 indicates highest level of industry interference, and 1 is low or no interference. Hence the lower the score, the better for the country. The 0 score indicates absence of evidence or not applicable. Where multiple pieces of evidence are found, the score applied reflects an average. For non-parties to the WHO FCTC, Question 4 should apply score of '0'. Non-Parties' total score should be divided by 95 X 100 to obtain the total score. The final score was determined through a process of verbal deliberation among the participating authors, during which differing perspectives were discussed and a consensus was reached.

To increase readability, the references to pieces of evidence are placed at the end of the report. The report covers information on incidents from **March 2023** up to **March 2025**, but also includes incidents prior to **2023** that still have relevance today.

Switzerland
Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2025
Results and Findings

INDICATOR 1: Level of Industry Participation in Policy-Development						
	0	1	2	3	4	5
1. The government[2] accepts, supports or endorses any offer for assistance by or in collaboration with the tobacco industry or any entity or person working to further its interests[3] in setting or implementing public health policies in relation to tobacco control[4] (Rec 3.4)						5

Switzerland has no formal rules against the participation of the tobacco industry in public health policy.

There are two notable ways the tobacco industry ensures its interests are represented in policy making. A third way (direct financing of political parties) is described below, under Indicator 6, #13.

A. Parliamentarians endorse tobacco industry interests

The Swiss Federal Assembly consists of two chambers: The National Council represents the people, and the Council of States represents the Cantons (States) in the development of new policies and laws. The Federal Assembly is based on a principle of "militia service" where MPs may be semi-professional and most of them continue to spend more than a third of their working time in another job (either as employees, independents, or paid members of company boards). Those activities are not considered a conflict of interest in Switzerland. There are also no rules against the participation of the tobacco industry in policy making. People working for tobacco companies can be elected as members of the Federal Assembly without having to resign from their job. Currently, several individuals representing the tobacco industry sit in both chambers of Parliament. For instance, Gregor Rutz, a member of the National Council of Switzerland since 2012, is also the salaried president of the Swiss Tobacco Trade Association (also called Swiss Tobacco). He has openly stated that he is committed to maintaining Switzerland as an attractive business location, supporting low taxes and opposing "unnecessary laws". He is a dedicated promoter of tobacco industry interests. The association which he chairs, Swiss Tobacco, is the umbrella organisation of companies and organisations in the Swiss wholesale and retail tobacco trade; it represents their interests in political, economic and social matters.

B. Tobacco lobbyists gain access to federal and Cantonal Parliaments

[2] The term "government" refers to any public official whether or not acting within the scope of authority as long as cloaked with such authority or holding out to another as having such authority
[3] The term, "tobacco industry' includes those representing its interests or working to further its interests, including the State-owned tobacco industry.
[4] "Offer of assistance" may include draft legislation, technical input, recommendations, oversees study tour

Lobbying or the representation of narrow social, sectorial, or corporate interests by members of Parliament themselves, as well as external lobbyists they invite, is an integral part of the Swiss "militia" style Parliament and the country's system of direct democracy. This system is a quintessential part of Switzerland's policy making process.

Martin Schläpfer, ex-lobbyist chief for the biggest Swiss supermarket chain "Migros", said in an article from the digital, investigative journalism magazine Republik, that "there are no clear rules of the game" and that there are different strategies lobbyists apply to win the attention of a Parliamentarian. Commonly, certain Parliamentarians will give lobbyists direct access to the Parliamentary building so they may network with others. More specifically, each member of Parliament is issued two access badges to the Parliament building. These badges give permanent access to the restricted areas of the building including the chamber lobbies.

Known cases of (direct/indirect) tobacco industry ties:

Hannes Germann has been a member of the Council of States since September 2002, representing the Swiss Peoples Party (German: Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), a national-conservative, right-wing populist political party in Switzerland. Another Republik article, showed that the tobacco industry network in the National Council and the Council of States is extensive. Hannes Germann is a chess piece in this network, having previously given one of his badges to the lobbyist Renate Hotz, who has had a mandate from BAT since 2007.

National Council member Philippe Nantermod of the Radical Liberal Party (FDP/PLR) [neo-liberal, conservative] has given one of his coveted access badges to Martin Kuonen, managing director of Swiss Cigarette, the front group for the three tobacco multinationals (BAT, JTI and PMI) in Switzerland. Martin Kuonen also holds the position of tobacco expert on the advertising self-regulatory Commission for Fairness (Schweizerische Lauterkeitskommission) and is the director of lobbying office Centre Patronal (see Indicator 1, #3 below).

National Council member Thomas Hurter of SVP has given one of his badges to another member of Centre Patronal, Philip Kristensen.

The president of the Commission for Fairness, National Councillor Philipp Kutter, representing Zurich and a member of The Centre party, is not known as an avid support for tobacco control measures, as he also sat in the committee opposing the people's initiative "Children and adolescents free from tobacco advertising", which was being voted on in 2022. Kutter described the initiative as "a disproportionate encroachment on the constitutionally guaranteed economic freedom and freedom of information."

Alois Gmür, National Council member until December 2023, representing the Canton Schwyz, and member of The Centre party, was a member of the Business Alliance for a Moderate Prevention Policy (Allianz der Wirtschaft für eine massvolle Präventionspolitik, AWMP/ Alliance des milieux économiques pour une politique de prévention modérée, AEMP), seen as one of the largest and most loyal allies of the tobacco industry in Switzerland, who's members and supporting organisations include Swiss Cigarette, JTI, Swiss Tobacco, KS/CS, and SGV/USAM (see Indicator 1, #3).

Fabio Regazzi, a National Councillor representing Ticino and a member of The Centre party, holds significant positions within Switzerland's economic and political spheres. He serves as the president of the Swiss Union of Arts and Crafts (SGV/USAM), the principal organisation representing small and medium-sized enterprises in Switzerland. Additionally, Regazzi is associated with AWMP/AEMP, a coalition that advocates for limited regulatory measures in public health, particularly concerning tobacco and alcohol (see Indicator 1, #3).

Markus Ritter, a National Councillor representing St. Gallen and member of The Centre party, has given one of his Parliamentary access badges to Francis Egger, secretary general of SwissTabac, and vice director of the Swiss Farmers Union. Markus Ritter has given his second access badge to Martin Rufer, director of the Swiss Farmers Union (see Indicator 1, #3).

On the Cantonal level, Susanne Brunner sits on Zurich's municipal council for the SVP and has represented the interests of PMI since 2019.

Strong, undeclared links to the tobacco industry:

Laurent Favre, a Councillor of State, has been described as a tobacco lobbyist, openly supporting tobacco industry interests since 2010. In 2012, the Swiss Parliament even voted in favour of a motion, put forward by Laurent Favre, to exclude tobacco from European public health negotiations, in order to allow the production in Switzerland of cigarettes with high tar and nicotine contents, banned in Europe, for export to certain Asian and African countries.

Marcel Dobler, National Councillor since 2015, representing St. Gallen and member of the Swiss Radical Liberal Party (FDP/PLR) has openly described the "Children and adolescents without tobacco" popular initiative as "extreme" and "unnecessary". He is also vice-president of digitalswitzerland (see Indicator 1, #3).

Similar descriptions of the initiative were used by Damian Müller, vice-president of the Commission for social security and public health in the Councillor of States since 2015, and representing Lucerne and member of the FDP/PLR. For instance, in two 2022 articles, Damian Müller describes the initiative as "unnecessary". In a 2023 SRF article, Damian Müller sites that the initiative drafts by the Federal Council to ban advertisements for children goes too far. In a televised interview following the vote, Müller not only defended his stance by stating, "we do not want to infantilise people; we want them to take responsibility," but also downplayed the severity of tobacco-related mortality by claiming there were only "a few hundred" tobacco deaths in Switzerland. This was despite the fact that, during the campaign, he had repeatedly been exposed to the accurate figure. When the journalist corrected him, stating that it nearly 10,000, Müller questioned the validity of the official number, thereby minimising the tobacco epidemic, arguably knowingly. In a 2024 podcast published by the Swiss Magazine Beobachter, journalists elaborate on a further tobacco industry link, stating that a JTI communications manager was present in his support committee for the upcoming election, and sponsored events he chairs as president (see Indicator 1, #3).

These two ways in which the tobacco industry interferes with policy making highlight the interconnected networks of tobacco industry representatives in the Federal and Cantonal Parliaments. It showcases the deep-rooted involvement of the industry in policy making. The often-complex webs of interactions allow the tobacco industry to collaborate with key political players to influence public health policies. Without any effective policies preventing such interactions or direct influences, the government essentially not only turns a blind eye, but **even endorses tobacco industry involvement in policy making**. As long as individuals working to further tobacco industry interests form key parts of Parliament, the Swiss government as a whole continues to collaborate with the tobacco industry in setting or implementing public health policies, particularly in relation to tobacco control.

2. The government accepts, supports or endorses policies or legislation drafted by or in collaboration with the tobacco industry. (Rec 3.4)						**5**

Before proceeding with important legislation or other projects of substantial impact, the Swiss Federal Consultations Act requires the federal government and parliament to solicit the views of the Cantons, the political parties and interested groups (*Vernehmlassungsverfahren*). Formal consultations are open not only for public review but also for public comment. The consultation process is designed to be transparent. The lists of invited and participating Cantons, authorities, individuals and organisations, the minutes of any consultation conferences and the respondents' submissions, as well as an unbiased summary of these submissions, are published and open to scrutiny.

Pursuant to Article 5.3 of the FCTC, parties shall protect their tobacco control public health policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law. Recommendation N° 2.2 of the WHO Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 5.3 provides that, if interactions with the tobacco industry are necessary, Parties should ensure that such interactions are conducted transparently and wherever possible in public. Recommendation 3.4 further requires parties not to accept any assistance, including draft legislation or policy, prepared by or in collaboration with the tobacco industry.

In Switzerland, the tobacco industry is permitted to participate in public consultations, like any other stakeholder with a vested interest. However, the current process ensures that such involvement remains transparent and accessible to the public. Although Switzerland has not yet ratified the FCTC, the consultation procedure would conform both to the letter and to the spirit of Article 5.3 and fulfilling Recommendation 2.2 of the WHO Guidelines.

However, certain safeguards intended to uphold the integrity of the process are either ineffectively applied or disregarded by the authorities during implementation, leaving significant gaps through which the tobacco industry can continue to influence the policy making process by means neither transparent nor public. Two cases we have identified (see below) exemplify these hidden mechanisms, the second one of which raises concerns in light of Recommendation 3.4 of the WHO Guidelines.

Industry participation in the federal consultation on the draft ordinance to the Tobacco Products Act:

The public consultation on the proposed ordinance on Tobacco Products and Electronic Cigarettes to implement the Tobacco Products Act of 1 October 2021 opened on 12 October 2023. The proposed ordinance outlined detailed rules on how similar products are defined and classified. It also included specific requirements for these products and their labelling, such as the design and content of health warnings. Additionally, it addressed industry self-regulation, product reporting obligations, and the responsibilities of enforcement authorities in overseeing and implementing the rules.

The consultation drew submissions from a wide range of interest groups. Many stakeholders from the tobacco and e-cigarette industries such as Swiss Cigarette, Swiss Tobacco, KS/CS, and SGV/USAM (see Indicator 1, #3 below) made formal submissions.

The 2024 report on the results of the consultation provides useful insight into the continued efforts by tobacco industry actors to influence the shape and scope of public health regulations. Economiesuisse, stated in their submission cover letter that the draft ordinance "is disproportionate and excessive in important respects" and heavily referenced the submissions by Swiss Cigarette and Philip Morris Switzerland. Similarly, Promarca, an association which represents the interests of companies in the consumer goods sector in Switzerland, echoes recurring tobacco industry arguments in their statement to avoid "unnecessary costs" and to work on "pragmatic regulations that take into account the interests of the industry concerned." They also then go on to refer once again to the detailed comments from Swiss Cigarette and Economiesuisse. The Swiss Vape Trade Association state that "The regulation goes disproportionately far".

Recurring industry wording and phrasing:

Article 10 of the proposed ordinance sets out the requirements for the product information leaflets referenced in Article 17(1) of the Tobacco Products Act. Submissions on this provision were mainly divided on the value of using QR codes for delivering product information. Industry and economic organisations opposed the inclusion of mandatory information leaflets, claiming that eliminating printed leaflets and relying solely on the use of QR codes would prevent littering and protect the environment. In contrast, public health organisations, and the Cantons argued for keeping the leaflet requirement. They warned that relying solely on QR codes or other digital formats would weaken consumer access to important information. The two sides remained clearly divided, with no overlap between health-focused concerns and environmentally motivated objections.

Recurring use of certain keywords and identical or similar sentence structures confirms many of the submissions were based partially and sometimes even entirely on model submissions prepared by a few national interest groups. For some of the proposed provisions, there is a clear split between the positions held by health organisations on the one hand and the positions held by tobacco industry actors on the other hand. Political parties and professional organisations aligned either with industry positions or with those of health proponents. The Cantons overwhelmingly favoured positions similar to those championed by public health organisations.

In the case of Article 10 of the proposed ordinance dealing with product information, two Cantons argued positions that very closely paralleled tobacco industry held positions without referring to the industry submissions themselves. Regarding these two provisions, the positions of all other participating Cantons were in direct opposition to industry positions. **This suggests that the two Cantons may have included draft policy language originating from tobacco industry interests, without disclosing its source.** Both these cantons have a significant tobacco industry presence in their jurisdictions.

This example could be considered to show activities by local governments that are contrary to both the transparency requirement and the implicit prohibition on accepting industry assistance under Article 5.3. Since Switzerland has yet to ratify the FCTC, such acceptance remains technically permissible under national law. Yet, once ratification is complete, this would no longer be the case, and we believe Switzerland would be then in breach of its treaty obligations.

Informal consultation on technical requirements for tasting zones at specialty retailers:

As part of the consultation on the draft ordinance, a separate informal consultation was held on proposed amendments to the protection from second-hand smoke legislation contained in a rider to the draft of the ordinance. The Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) writes in the 2024 consultation report that the consultation aimed to collect opinions on technical requirements for the planned concession of tasting zones of heated tobacco products and e-cigarettes in specialized stores.

The list of invited organisations shows that all cantons, through the responsible departments, as well as two tobacco industry organisations, two economic organisations as well as two health organisations were invited to respond. The FOPH stated the list was kept intentionally short as most health organisations had already made detailed submissions regarding the proposed tasting zones. In all, 30 opinions from the cantonal governments, tobacco and e-cigarette stakeholders (Swiss Cigarette, Swiss Tobacco, PMI, JTI, Economiesuisse, SGV/USAM, and Swiss Vape Trade Association) as well as from health organizations were submitted.

Under the paragraph titled "Adequate Ventilation", the report notes: "*2 economic associations and 5 tobacco interest groups reject the formulation that the tasting zone must be equipped with adequate (mechanical) ventilation. It should only be able to be sufficiently ventilated*".

The industry was arguing for less stringent language that would allow the industry to avoid having to invest in mechanical ventilation systems.

While their input on the functionality of ventilation systems may have some technical merit**, it also creates opportunities for the industry to influence decisions in ways that conflict with public health objectives.** For example, involving the tobacco industry in discussions about ventilation might seem reasonable if the goal is to ensure systems effectively reduce tobacco smoke. However, if that was the goal, the list of experts invited by the FOPH to the informal consultation raises a critical question: why weren't independent experts on health, safety, or indoor air quality consulted? By excluding these voices, **regulators handed the industry a valuable opportunity to advocate for weaker ventilation standards.** Such biased selection processes, whether intentional or inadvertent, risk producing regulatory outcomes that undermine public health protections. Besides, this is not an isolated case, but interferences have occurred and will continue to occur throughout the policy making process.

This example highlights the risk of inviting only tobacco industry representatives to comment on technical aspects of regulations, such as ventilation requirements.

3. The government allows/invites the tobacco industry to sit in government interagency/ multi-sectoral committee/ advisory group body that sets public health policy. (Rec 4.8)						5

Swiss Parliamentarians are often offered to sit on boards and advisory bodies or retained as freelance consultants by corporations or interest groups, for which they will also frequently be remunerated. This is not only legal in Switzerland but even built into the system and seen as a vital and legitimate part of the legislative process. Elected members of Parliament are under a limited obligation to disclose the interests they may be representing (i.e. professional activities, membership of a company's board), but **many potential conflicts such as paid consultancy mandates do not need to be disclosed**. This lack of transparency in the Swiss system is criticised by anti-lobbying organisations. The tobacco industry perspective is thus well represented in the policy process, as it is customary to invite financially and politically relevant organisations and associations to consult on policy drafts (as described in Indicator 1, #2).

These financially and politically relevant bodies include multi-sectoral boards, advisory groups, or corporate unions, where they set out policy and lobbying goals. Governments at all levels will regularly and directly engage with these on policy matters.

Overview of relevant stakeholders with ties to the tobacco industry:
Swiss Cigarette:
Swiss Cigarette is a tobacco industry front group representing the interests of the "big three", PMI, BAT and JTI in Switzerland. Amongst their association's purposes, the group states that it aims to protect the rights and interests of free production, marketing, and communication of products to adult consumers, while developing and monitoring advertising and promotion regulations for responsible marketing. The managing director is the tobacco lobbyist, Martin Kuonen.

Swiss Tobacco:
The Swiss Tobacco Trade Association (also called Swiss Tobacco) is a well networked industry stakeholder, of which SVP National Councillor Gregor Rutz is the salaried president. The association serves as an umbrella organisation for the wholesale and retail companies in the Swiss tobacco sector. Its 25 members and affiliated associations include the long-established Swiss cigar company Oettinger Davidoff, as well as the Swiss Retail Federation, a heavyweight in the retail lobby.

SwissTabac:
The government has also been found to sit with and advise or receive advice from SwissTabac, which is the umbrella organisation for the country's tobacco growers. The organisation is responsible for organising the production of tobacco in Switzerland, as well as for the professional protection of its members. The president is Fabrice Bersier, also part of Fenaco (see below). The secretary general of SwissTabac's board of directors is Francis Egger, who was also the vice director of the Swiss Farmers' Union until 2025, as well as listed as a member of the Agricultural Research

Council, an advisory agency of the Federal Office for Agriculture, which in turn is subordinate to the Federal Department of EconomIc Affairs, Education and Research. Francis Egger also has been invited into Parliament by National Councillor Markus Ritter. SwissTabac's influence on tobacco control policy is reinforced by this close partnership with government bodies (as seen in Indicator 1, #2).

SGV/USAM**:**
The Swiss Trade Association (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband SGV/Union des arts et métiers USAM) has been the largest and most loyal ally of the tobacco industry in Switzerland for decades and its political arm for intervening in Swiss public health policy. Its president, vice-president and several board directors are members of Parliament. They list Swiss Cigarette as one of their members.

AWMP/AEMP:
In 2008, SGV/USAM created the Alliance of Economic Circles for a Moderate Prevention Policy (AWMP/AEMP) "in response to the FOPH [Federal Office of Public Health]'s new programmes on tobacco, health and food." It is a central umbrella lobby, and the Alliance includes among its active members JTI, Swiss Tobacco, KS/CS, and SGV, while its supporting members include Swiss Cigarette and IG Freiheit. AWMP/AEMP has consistently worked to oppose stricter advertising rules, notably playing a leading role in the campaign against the "Children Without Tobacco" initiative. It coordinated a network of economic stakeholders to promote industry-aligned messaging amplifying arguments to defend tobacco advertising while concealing the direct interests of tobacco companies. AEMP framed the initiative as an infringement on economic freedoms, ignoring its focus on protecting youth. Despite receiving indirect financial support from major tobacco firms (as publicised by the press, such as Le Temps and RTS), AEMP failed to prevent the initiative's approval and since then, the "No" campaign website has been blank. AEMP often operates discreetly, if not covertly. As such, we lack direct evidence, such as emails or letters sent to right-wing Parliamentarians with whom it is aligned. However, AEMP director Mikael Huber has occasionally issued public statements. Following the success of the "Children Without Tobacco" initiative, which AEMP had strongly opposed, he published an article asserting that the alliance would double down on promoting "moderate" prevention. In this view, prevention is based solely on individual responsibility, and any state intervention is deemed excessive.

IG Freheit:
IG Freiheit is a free-market think tank chaired by the president of Swiss Tobacco, Gregor Rutz, and whose board members are nearly all current or former members of the Swiss Parliament. IG Freiheit was founded in September 2006 by a group of entrepreneurs and politicians. On their "About Us" page they state that they: "stand up for the civil liberties of citizens and against the enactment of unnecessary state regulations."

KS/CS:

KS/CS Communication Switzerland is the umbrella organisation for commercial communication in Switzerland. They state that their focus is on federal politics and are involved in the development of advertising policy in the Cantons and municipalities. Amongst their premium partners, they list JTI, PMI, and BAT. Their 2022 opinion statement in reponse to the consultation draft on the partial revision of the Tobacco Products Act showcased their tobacco industry support. They stated that the draft regulation should be "limited to an appropriate, constitutionally compliant implementation of the popular initiative "Yes to the protection of children and young people from tobacco advertising". KS/CS Communication Switzerland rejects any further regulation." They often organise events between their partners and Parliamentarians (see Indicator 5, #11).

Fenaco:

Fenaco is an agricultural cooperative federation in Switzerland. They are governed by 19 board members, among them Fabrice Bersier, the president of SwissTabac, Johanna Gapany, currently member of the Council of States (who in 2024 replaced Leo Müller, National Councillor), and Pierre-André Geiser, previously in the Council of Bern, as well as Martin Schori, Municipal Councillor of Radelfingen. Fenaco's annual report 2023 states that the board members hold monthly meetings, amongst others, where they take "decisions on business that falls within its area of responsibility."

Swiss Farmers Union:

The Swiss Farmers Union (*Union Suisse des paysans*, USP) is the umbrella organisation for Swiss agriculture. The association is made up of representatives from 25 cantonal farmers' associations and various professional associations. Among their partner organisation we find SwissTabac, and Fenaco. Moreover, Francis Egger was the vice director until 2025 and is still shown as such on their website. Egger for instance was responsible for the USP's 2022 opinion statement in response to the partial revision of the Tobacco Products act, using similar wording as order industry stakeholders. In response to the "children free from tobacco" initiative, USP state that a total ban on tobacco advertisements "goes too far" and that it "violates the constitutionally guaranteed economic and commercial freedom".

Digitalswitzerland**:**

digitalswitzerland is a Swiss-wide, cross-industry initiative with more than 240 association members. National Councillor Marcel Dobler, as well as a couple of members of the National Council and representatives of Swiss universities are amongst its executive and steering committee. Amongst its many members one finds PMI, Fenaco along with the City of Zurich, and several Swiss universities.

Promarca:

Promarca is an association which represents the interests of companies in the consumer goods sector in Switzerland. JTI is found among their members, as well as part of their communication and sustainability commissions. In 2024, JTI was in the top 5 of Promarca's sustainability awards. Further showcasing their network and support for tobacco industry interests, Promarca have in the past invited General Manager of JUUL Labs Jonathan Green as a speaker, and are members of the Commission of Fairness, and KS/CS.

Luga:
Damian Müller is the president of the patronage committee of the Luga, an annual spring fair taking place in central Switzerland. JTI and Philip Morris Switzerland are listed as exhibitors at the fair. Since 2024, 16 of their 31 listed patronage members are National Councillors or Councillors of State.

Economiesuisse:
Economiesuisse, the Federation of Swiss Business, is committed to "maintaining Switzerland as a strong business location […] based on liberal free market principles." Their work predominantly lies in influencing politics, applying different approaches throughout the political cycle in Switzerland, including public affairs, outreach and lobbying. It is in the organisation of Economiesuisse that the complex partnerships between the government and the tobacco industry become most apparent. Key tobacco industry individuals sit on the Economiesuisse board:

- Kevin Suter, Director Corporate Affairs & Communications **JTI**, and representative of **Swiss Cigarette** (up to 2025)
- Francois Thoenen, Director External Affairs, Member of the Managing Board **PMI**

As well as Parliamentarians:

- Magdalena Martullo-Blocher, National Councillor (Graubünden, SVP)
- Marcel Dobler, National Councillor (St. Gallen, FDP/PLR) (see Indicator 1, #1), also vice president of digitalswitzerland
- Simon Michel, National Councillor (Solothurn, FDP/PLR)
- Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter, National Councillor (Basel-Country, The Centre)

Sitting on the Managing Director's Committee of Economiesuisse one finds:

- Martin Kuonen, Director of **Swiss Cigarette**, who also has a lobbying access badge to the Swiss Parliament (see Indicator 1, #1)
- Florian Németi, Neuchâtel Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CNCI)

Centre Patronal:
Martin Kuonen is also employed as director of the Swiss German branch of the political lobbying group Centre Patronal Suisse. Swiss Cigarette is also listed on the Centre Patronal website as one of the associations they serve – of course, as Martin Kuonen is also the managing director of Swiss Cigarette. In their annual 2023 report, Centre Patronal go on to state that they are represented in numerous bodies, including numerous Cantonal commissions in the Canton of Vaud. A 2022 article on the Centre Patronal website, written by Martin Kuonen, showcases his pro-tobacco industry views as he criticises the popular initiative "Children without tobacco" regulation draft, and denounces any extensive ban of tobacco advertisements.

Economiesuisse serves as a prime example of high-level government officials and tobacco industry representatives collaborating within the same decision-making bodies. More importantly, this list of stakeholders highlights the **intricate network of connections between governmental entities, tobacco industry representatives, and advisory groups in Switzerland**. It begins to become apparent how the same industry representatives appear in multiple front groups, or

advisory bodies. Thus, several stakeholders, initially perceived as independent, have actually been infiltrated by the same, reoccurring lobbyists or parliamentarians who consistently support the tobacco industry.						
4. The government nominates or allows representatives from the tobacco industry (including State-owned) in the delegation to the COP or other subsidiary bodies or accepts their sponsorship for delegates. (i.e. COP 4 & 5, INB 4 5, WG) (Rec 4.9 & 8.3) **For non-COP year, follow the previous score of COP year.**	**0**					
We have no knowledge that persons with ties to the tobacco industry have been invited by the Swiss government to the Swiss delegation to the COP.						
INDICATOR 2: Industry CSR activities						
5. A. Government agencies or their officials endorse, support, form partnerships with or participates in activities of the tobacco industry described as socially responsible. For example, environmental programs. (Rec 6.2) **B. The government (its agencies and officials) receives CSR contributions[5] (monetary or otherwise, including CSR contributions) from the tobacco industry or those working to further its interests (eg political, social, financial, educational, community or other contributions (Rec 6.4) including environmental or EPR activities (COP10 Dec).** ***NOTE: exclude enforcement activities as this is covered in another question***						**5**

A. Social Responsibility Partnerships and Government Involvement

According to the WHO FCTC, which Switzerland has yet to ratify, CSR activities by the tobacco industry are considered a form of tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship aimed at enhancing the industry's image. As such, Article 13 of the WHO FCTC requires a comprehensive ban on tobacco advertising, including CSR activities by the tobacco industry.

The Swiss government still lacks a clear policy prohibiting its departments from entering into partnerships with, or accepting funding from, the tobacco industry. As documented in the 2023 Swiss Tobacco Industry Interference Index, this regulatory gap leaves the door open to tobacco industry influence across various federal agencies.

IGSU Clean-Up Partnership, FOEN, and JTI

The Interest Group for a Clean Environment (IGSU), self declared as the Swiss Competence Centre Against Littering, was founded in 2007 and promotes personal responsibility around littering. Its flagship campaign, the national *Clean-Up-Day*, is supported by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) as an "institutional partner". This collaboration between the FOEN and the

[5] political, social, financial, educations, community, technical expertise or training to counter smuggling or any other forms of contributions

IGSU has been going on for years. On the website of the FOEN about plastic, cigarette butts are not mentioned even though they are the most common single disposal item. Among the IGSU's other listed partners are **JTI and Coop**, a major retail chain that sells tobacco products. In a 2024 press release, IGSU echoed that they are supported by the FOEN, yet choose to omit mentioning JTI as a partner.



Image: Screenshot of IGSU Partners, encircled are JTI, COOP and the FOEN

For the September 2024 Clean-Up-Day, IGSU rolled out public awareness campaigns featuring posters and street installations encouraging people to dispose of their waste properly. Passersby were invited to sign a board stating: *"So that waste does not remain on the ground, we throw our rubbish in the bin."*

Image: A lady passer-by writing a comment on the IGSU board on national Clean-Up Day in 2024, with only JTI's logo shown next to IGSU's own (red encircled).

Together against cigarette-littering – FOEN and the tobacco industry

Meanwhile, the French-speaking newspaper *Le Temps* published an article in 2024 titled "Cigarette butts in nature: during its roundtables, Bern mostly gives the floor to tobacco manufacturers". In the article, they highlighted concerns regarding the FOEN's approach to addressing cigarette butt pollution. The FOEN are criticised for lacking neutrality, predominantly involving tobacco industry representatives in recurrent roundtable discussions, as well as the consultancy with industry ties Ecoplan, while excluding key stakeholders from public health and environmental sectors. These meetings were not publicly disclosed and only became available following a freedom of information request by AT Switzerland. In its greenwashing report "Green Coat, Same Stain" published in September 2024, AT Switzerland reveals the participants of the roundtable meetings.

This was already flagged in the last country report for the GTI and since then, **no binding outcomes have resulted from FOEN's roundtables fiasco, showcasing Switzerland's policy stagnation.** Worse yet, the FOEN has continued their collaboration and launched the *Together against cigarette-littering ("Gemeinsam gegen Zigaretten-Littering")* project, involving a long list of industry actors, lobby groups and industry allies, including BAT, JTI, PMI, IGSU, Farmers Union, Swiss Cigarette, Swiss Retail Federation, and Swiss Tobacco.

Unternehmen / Verbände / Kanton	Name	Vorname
British American Tobacco (BAT)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Interessengemeinschaft Saubere Umwelt (IGSU)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Japan Tobacco International (JTI)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Kanton Basel-Stadt, Abteilung Abfall und Rohstoffe	[redacted]	[redacted]
Philip Morris International (PMI)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Schweizerischer Bauernverband (SBV)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Schweizerischer Verband Kommunale Infrastruktur (SVKI)	[redacted]	[redacted]
Swiss Cigarette	[redacted]	[redacted]
Vereinigung des Schweizerischen Tabakwarenhandels	[redacted]	[redacted]

Image description: Participants of the 2022 roundtables on cigarette littering. Highlighted in yellow are direct representatives of the tobacco industry, blue are pro-tobacco lobbying groups, and purple are participants who receive funding from tobacco companies or have direct ties to them.

Nuit de l'industrie:
Nuit de l'industrie (Industry Night) is a concept organised by the Neuchâtel Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CNCI), where participants may receive guided tours of various companies in three regions of the canton. As part of their 2025 partners, you find Philip Morris. Not all too surprising, considering PMI's headquarters, research centre and factory in Neuchâtel. Moreover, Florian Németi from the CNCI sits with Martin Kuonen on the Economiesuisse managing director committee (see Indicator 1, #3).

Spotlight on Japan Tobacco International CSR activities
JTI is heavily involved in other CSR activities throughout Switzerland, many involving cultural or social institutions with ties to federal, or Cantonal offices.

Orchestre de la Suisse Romande
The Orchestre de la Suisse Romande is a private foundation funded primarily by the City of Geneva, the Canton of Vaud, as well as the Canton of Geneva, which is also represented in the foundation's board of trustees. JTI is listed as an institutional partner.

Grand Théâtre de Genève
The Grand Théâtre de Genève is considered the largest artistic stage in Switzerland. They are governed by the Foundation of the Grand Théâtre de Genève in the form of a municipal public service foundation. They are mainly financed by the City of Geneva, with a board of directors appointed by the Municipal Council and the Executive Council of the City of Geneva. 7 of the boards of directors are members of the Municipal Council. They accept amongst their "Grand Patrons" JTI.

Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art (MAMCO), Geneva
On their website, MAMCO state that they are a public foundation overseen by MAMCO's Foundation and the Canton and City of Geneva. They list JTI amongst their main sponsors. Amongst MAMCO Foundation's co-founders they list Pierre de Labouchère, who served as President and CEO of JTI from 1999 to 2013.

Image: Screenshot of MAMCO's main sponsors, including JTI with the Canton and city of Geneva.

Kunstmuseum Luzern
The Kunstmuseum Luzern (Art Museum Lucerne) lists the Canton and the City of Lucerne amongst their partners, and JTI amongst their sponsors.

Zurich Film Festival
The Zurich Film Festival, held annually in Zurich since 2005, is considered a prestigious event in the European film industry. It has been supported by federal and cantonal institutions, such as the Federal Office of Culture, the Zurich Department of Culture, and the City of Zurich. JTI is also listed as a cooperation partner of the festival.



Image: Screenshots of Federal and Cantonal Supporters, as well as Cooperation Partners of the Zurich Film Festival, including JTI.

Lucerne Dialogue:
Lucerne Dialogue is an initiative that organises business conferences. JTI is listed as a premium member their webpage. Amongst their partners, Lucerne Dialogue lists various governmental actors, including the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the canton of Lucerne, city of Lucerne, canton of Zug, as well as various patron cantons, such as Aargau, Bern, Graubünden, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, St. Gallen, Uri, Valais and Zurich. The 2025 European Economic Forum, which Lucerne Dialogue are organising, even has the Federal Councillor Ignazio Cassis listed as a speaker. He heads FDFA and already was involved in national scandal where the FDFA agreed to allow PMI as a sponsor for the Swiss Dubai Expo 2020 stand.

Further institutions where JTI is listed as a partner include Kunsthaus Zurich, or the Geneva Press Club.

Although the recent Tobacco Products Act, which came into force October 2024, specifically bans the tobacco industry from sponsoring events and activities organised by the confederation, and other federal authorities, key cultural and museum sponsorships have continued. All these cultural actors have a combination of federal, cantonal and/or city councils as partners or patrons. **This demonstrates the laws flimsy enforcement and continued legitimisation of tobacco industry partnerships under the guise of corporate social responsibility.**

INDICATOR 3: Benefits to the Tobacco Industry

6.	The government accommodates requests from the tobacco industry for a longer time frame for implementation or postponement of						**5**

tobacco control law. (e.g. 180 days is common for PHW, Tax increase can be implemented within 1 month) (Rec 7.1)						

Switzerland has not ratified the WHO FCTC, which has greatly benefited the tobacco industry, as minimal and non-encompassing federal tobacco control laws act as a playground for the industry.

In two cases, documents published by Swiss Tobacco reveal official requests, and mentions of corresponding accommodations, for extended deadlines to implement tobacco regulations. These include a ban on disposable e-cigarettes in the canton of Valais and a prohibition on selling disposable e-cigarettes and other nicotine products to minors in the canton of Vaud. One letter was addressed to the Valais cantonal health minister and the other letter to the Vaud cantonal trade police.

7. The government gives privileges, incentives, tax exemptions, subsidies, financial incentives, or benefits to the tobacco industry (Rec 7.3)						**5**

Swiss Tobacco Farmers receive Financial Support

In 2024, according to SwissTabac, 114 Swiss farmers grew tobacco on some 366 hectares. As described in previous Switzerland Tobacco Index country reports, the Swiss government has introduced a subsidy system linked to the Swiss tobacco Tax. Since tobacco is a labor-intensive tropical crop poorly suited to Switzerland's climate, it is not economically viable to grow without support. As a result, Swiss farmers receive around 40,000 CHF per hectare of planted tobacco[6] from the Swiss Tobacco Finance Fund ("Finanzierungsfonds Inlandtabak"). An earmarked tobacco levy exactly equal to the levy which supports the Swiss Tobacco Finance Fund, goes into the Tobacco Prevention Fund, created to fund tobacco prevention projects. At the centre of this system of subsidies stands the Cooperative Society for the Purchase of Indigenous Tobacco, "Einkaufsgenossenschaft für Inlandtabak", (SOTA), which is under the supervision of the Federal Office for Customs and Border Security (FOCBS). Every year, SOTA buys the entire Swiss tobacco harvest directly from the farmers and sells it to the three big cigarette manufacturers in the country, PMI, BAT and JTI. Tobacco growing in Switzerland is therefore only possible through a sophisticated subsidy support system established by the Swiss government.

For instance, **between 2015 and 2020, Swiss tobacco farmers would have received more than 29 million CHF (32 million USD) in subsidies to maintain tobacco growing.**

The slow decline of tobacco farmers in Switzerland to 114 in 2024, down from 357 in 2001 (–68%), despite significant financial subsidies, proves tobacco cultivation in Switzerland is simply not viable in the long run. Even the former secretary general and current technical director of the SOTA, Gernot-Viktor Alber, has stated that "Without this structure, Swiss tobacco cultivation would already no longer exist today." Nevertheless, supporters of the subsidy system state that tobacco cultivation is "an ancient Swiss tradition" worthy of public support. The government thus continues to allow the provision of 40,000 CHF per hectare of tobacco to rescue 114 tobacco farmers, while it could make better use of this money to protect its population from the harms of smoking.

[6] About € 43,000, or USD 50,000 (exchange rate July 2025)

In other words, **the government, through the SOTA, directly supports with tax money an industry whose products are amongst the most important causes of non-communicable diseases, reduced quality of life and premature mortality**. In a sense, the government also supports these tobacco products themselves.

International companies receive often state tax reduction either in general or for an initial period of some years. It is unknown if the transnational companies PMI, JTI or BAT receive such tax reductions, nor is it known how much taxes they pay to the cantons (states) where they siege.

Tobacco giants in the list of investments of the state pension fund
As described in the 2023 Swiss report for the Global Tobacco Index, tobacco giants such as BAT, JTI, and PMI are listed among the investments of the Swiss state pension fund, OASI (AHV/AVS), managed by the federal institution Compenswiss. Despite ongoing public calls for ethical investment practices, including Claudia Künzli of the Swiss Lung Association, as well as a motion by National Council member Ursula Schneider Schüttel to stop such investments, the Federal Council has refused to act, asserting that it is not within their competence to dictate investment decisions. Both Compenswiss and Publica, another public pension fund, have defended their investments, citing the legality of tobacco products and claiming that financial investors should not address social problems. This even though the tobacco industry violates human rights (child labour, working conditions, poor pay etc) in various countries and is fundamentally unsustainable. It is this deep-rooted support for the tobacco industry in Switzerland that stands in the way of an adequate tobacco control policy. Actors such as Compenswiss and Publica are playing a role in the normalisation of tobacco among the general public. People are turning away from the real damage caused by the industry, and the tobacco companies themselves are seen as legitimate voices to be heard when it comes to health, trade and other policies. These two phenomena harm public health. One example that contrasts sharply with Switzerland: Norway's state pension fund has excluded investments in the tobacco industry since 2010, for ethical reasons.

INDICATOR 4: Forms of Unnecessary Interaction

8. Top level government officials (such as President/ Prime Minister or Minister[7]) meet with/ foster relations with the tobacco companies such as attending social functions and other events sponsored or organized by the tobacco companies or those furthering its interests. (Rec 2.1)						**5**

Here we point to the conflation between parliamentarians and the tobacco industry as well as its associations (see above).

Numerous top level government officials meet or foster relations with tobacco companies. As Martin Schläpfer, ex-lobbyist in Switzerland, has said "As a lobbyist, you have to have two qualities: You should enjoy eating, and you should have a bad memory."

[7] Includes immediate members of the families of the high-level officials

In the Republik article, Schläpfer describes the commonplace nature of parliamentarians meeting and attending social functions organised or paid for by companies. Even the PR-agency Furrerhugi has chosen high-class gastronomy as its strategic concept: it welcomes guests to the "Clé de Berne", where there are just five tables. An anonymous source has informed the Swiss Association for Tobacco Control that behind closed doors at an industry-funded social event, parliamentarians were invited to decide on future relevant votes, with one parliamentarian openly stating that their vote can be bought. Furrerhugi themselves have 3 people part of their team with access badges to the parliamentary halls.

It is clear that throughout the year, there are various undeclared meetings taking place between relevant parliamentarians, or other government officials and the tobacco industry (see Indicator 5, #11). Economiesuisse for instance states that "We conduct an open, constructive, and solution-oriented dialog with our members, with the federal administration, the members of the federal Parliament, with the governments of the confederation and the Cantons, and with the public. We engage in regular exchanges of views with all parties and economically relevant groups and with society at large." In light of our comments under Indicator 1, #3, it becomes apparent that **Economiesuisse is a vehicle for fostering relations between government officials and the tobacco industry**.

Such relations are also present at the **cantonal and city level**, especially where the industry is implanted. According to the magazine *Bilan*, 'for some fifteen years now, once a year, the State Council of Neuchâtel in corpore [the whole cantonal government] has met with PMI management to hear their demands'.

9. The government accepts assistance/ offers of assistance from the tobacco industry on enforcement such as conducting raids on tobacco smuggling or enforcing smoke free policies or no sales to minors. (including monetary contribution for these activities) (Rec 4.3)					**4**	

The Commission for Fairness is a private institution ensuring self-regulation of commercial advertising in Switzerland. Since 1992, it has had a voluntary, non-binding, self-regulatory agreement with Swiss Cigarette, BAT, JTI and PMI. The agreement is often cited by industry-supporting fractions of the government, such as the Social Security and Health Committees (SSHC), of the Parliament. Members of the Council of States in the SSHC for instance include Damian Müller, President of the SSHC, as well as Hannes Germann, and Johanna Gapany (see Indicator 1, #3 for links to the industry).
Moreover, the president of the Commission for Fairness himself, Philipp Kutter, is a National Councillor. They further list Martin Kuonen from Swiss Cigarette as one of their engaged experts on tobacco. The agreement was updated in 2005 and most recently in 2018. Its declared goal is to ensure a self-enforcement, namely that tobacco products "be marketed responsibly and appropriate measures be taken to ensure that the promotion and dissemination of these products are directed to adult smokers, not minors, and meet the information needs of adults to exercise their free choice." This is a typical example of a self-regulation tactic, whereby the industry's adoption of voluntary marketing protocols appears attractive and thus avert any effective regulations (which we

have extensively explained in previous Swiss country reports). Even KS/CS openly state on their website on self-regulation that:

"Self-regulation has responsible creative power. It can help to avoid restrictions and bans."

KS/CS Communication go on to say that they are heavily involved with the Commission of Fairness and thus supports their work.

Apart from its well-known limitations and that such self-regulatory agreements repeatedly fail for the simple reason that they are not intended to succeed, the voluntary agreement is flawed for two additional reasons. According to the agreement, no advertising may be placed in printed publications unless there is a basis for assuming that at least 80% of the readership of the publication in question are adults. This, however, **still allows for up to 20% of the readership to be underage, exposing youth to tobacco advertising** – a risk that is far too high when the goal is to protect the youth. Secondly, the agreement only accounts for readers aged 14-17, neglecting those under 14 who are equally, if not more susceptible to tobacco marketing. Data from 2022 show that the consumption rates of students aged 11 to 15 years old have been increasing. Therefore, it fails to provide adequate protection for younger children.

A similar self-regulatory agreement, the so-called Codex of the Swiss Vape Trade Association, was developed for manufacturers and retailers on the marketing of e-cigarettes and liquids (until the entry into force of the Tobacco Products Act in October 2024).

10. The government accepts, supports, endorses, or enters into partnerships or non-binding agreements with the tobacco industry or any entity working to further its interests. (Rec 3.1) ***NOTE: This must not involve CSR, enforcement activity, or tobacco control policy development since these are already covered in the previous questions.***					**4**	

In the 2023 Swiss Tobacco Industry Interference Index, we highlighted an alarming partnership between PMI and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ), a public institution. Since then, we have obtained and reviewed the full contract governing this collaboration. Our in-depth analysis reveals the extent to which this relationship compromises the integrity of academic research by embedding a tobacco industry agenda within federally funded science. PMI designed and supervised the study. This partnership raises serious concerns about conflicts of interest, the misuse of public resources, and the erosion of scientific independence in Switzerland.

In 2024, the French-language newspaper *Bilan* published an article titled "Philip Morris and Neuchatel, a special bond over 60 years". It highlighted Philip Morris's perceived economic importance in Neuchâtel and how members of the State Council have consistently defended the company's interests. The article noted that "for the last fifteen years or so, once a year, the [Neuchâtel] State Council has met PMI's management in corpore to hear their demands".

INDICATOR 5: Transparency						
11. The government does not publicly disclose meetings/ interactions with the tobacco industry in cases where such interactions are strictly necessary for regulation. (Rec 2.2)						**5**

There is no law in place that requires the government to proactively disclose meetings or interactions with the tobacco industry. Federal and Cantonal transparency laws provide for limited disclosure through freedom of information requests.

While the Transparency act does require some meetings to be disclosed, no rules apply to members of Parliament and any additional information is difficult to provide, as **there are no rules in Switzerland requiring government officials to pro-actively disclose meetings with tobacco industry representatives and any related meeting notes for the record.**

Public cases where the government did not disclose its meetings with the industry:
In their annual report 2023, KS/CS write that in May 2023, members of the "Market and Advertising" Parliamentary group met with KS/CS premium members (who include JTI, PMI and BAT). KS/CS go on to describe in their report:

"Federal Councillor Guy Parmelin gave a speech on the importance of advertising. The head of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs spoke clearly in favour of a strong advertising industry. Following the statutory business, in which all of the Board's motions were adopted, National Councillor Gregor Rutz, President of the Parliamentary Group "Market and Advertising", spoke about its activities. In view of the many initiatives submitted to ban or regulate advertising, the preparatory, thematic work of KS/CS is also greatly appreciated by members of Parliament."

Finally, they state that: "The informal exchange in Lucerne was appreciated by all participants and will be repeated in 2024."

It is also clear that throughout the year, there are board member meetings of Fenaco, Economiesuisse or others from other relevant stakeholders (see Indicator 1, #3) where both tobacco industry representatives and high-level government officials are present. Moreover, numerous meetings with lobbyists are not publicly disclosed, many taking place at exclusive social events behind closed doors, such as at the Clé de Berne restaurant in Bern. Martin Hilti, Managing Director of the organisation Transparency International has stated that: "In Switzerland, lobbying is largely unregulated. There is insufficient transparency about lobbying activities, there is no guarantee that everyone has equal access to politics, and thirdly, there is no guarantee that the actors must behave with integrity." "In other countries, every coffee and every meeting with a lobbyist has to be disclosed."

12. The government requires rules for the disclosure or registration of tobacco industry entities, affiliated organizations, and individuals acting on their behalf including lobbyists (Rec 5.3)						**5**

While some general rules on disclosure exists, it is not specific to tobacco and has loopholes that can be exploited.

Article 11 of the Federal Act on the Federal Assembly states: "*On assuming office and at the start of every year, each assembly member must inform his or her office in writing about his or her:*

a. professional activities; if the assembly member is an employee, they must give information about their position and their employer;
b. further activities on management or supervisory committees as well as advisory committees and similar bodies of Swiss and foreign business undertakings, institutions and foundations under private and public law;
c. activities as a consultant or as a specialist adviser to federal agencies;
d. permanent management or consultancy activities on behalf of Swiss or foreign interest groups;
e. participation in committees or other organs of the Confederation.

In the case of activities listed in paragraph letters b–e, the assembly member shall declare whether the activity is voluntary or paid.

The Parliamentary Services maintain a public register containing the information provided by assembly members (Councillors of State/National Councillors)."

This rule is a measure to ensure that the public is aware of how the affiliations of Parliament members may influence their decisions. The rule applies to all affiliations and not just tobacco industry specific affiliations. Additionally, this measure is limited to members of the Federal Assembly. It does not apply to governmental officials. The rule also specifically lists the situations to which it applies, limiting itself to specific kinds of potential conflicts of interest, allowing for some large loopholes.
For instance, owning a large portfolio of tobacco stocks does not need to be declared; management and consultancy functions on behalf of Swiss or foreign interest groups need to be declared only if they are "permanent", etc. Finally, this is an honour system: there are no penalties for omissions or misleading declarations. Easily ignored, the rule cannot be considered reliable.

Therefore, **there exists no comprehensive rule requiring policy makers to disclose all their ties to tobacco industry entities or to individuals, including lobbyists, acting on their behalf, and no such policy is currently being developed.**

INDICATOR 6: Conflict of Interest

13. The government does not prohibit contributions from the tobacco industry or any entity working to further its interests to political parties, candidates, or campaigns or to require full disclosure of such contributions. (Rec 4.11) ***1 Never 5 Yes***					**4**	

At the federal level, **Switzerland has no national legislation for prohibiting any type of contributions from the tobacco industry to political candidates, parties, or campaigns**. It is the only country in the Council of Europe that has not passed legislation to regulate political funding.

While members of Parliament are required to disclose their professional roles and affiliations, they are not obliged to specify the amounts they earn or the financial value of their mandates. Additionally, parliamentarians are not required to disclose their financial investments, such as shares or ownership stakes in companies that could be affected by their legislative work. This lack of detail undermines transparency and public trust. Citizens and journalists are prevented from assessing the true extent of potential conflicts of interest. Moreover, the system relies entirely on self-reporting, with no independent verification or effective sanctions in place. This means that incomplete or misleading declarations often go unnoticed and unpunished, reducing the accountability of elected officials.

Political financing also remains largely opaque. Until October 2023, there were no legal obligations to declare campaign donations, and even now, the rules are partial and limited. Contributions under CHF 15,000 do not have to be disclosed, and in some Cantons, transparency requirements are minimal or non-existent. As a result, corporations and interest groups can still quietly fund campaigns without public scrutiny. These kinds of **structural weaknesses allow economic lobbies to exert influence behind the scenes and weaken the integrity of Swiss democratic processes**.

For the first time in 2023, under the revised Federal Act on Political Rights and its implementing ordinance on transparency in political financing, political parties represented in the Swiss Federal Assembly were required to declare their annual income and identify any donor. In the context of the October 2023 federal election, a review of the public transparency register revealed that the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Swiss Radical Liberal Party (FDP/PLR) **each received CHF 35,000 from Philip Morris** to support their respective campaigns. These financial ties are not surprising, given that both parties have maintained numerous direct and indirect connections to the tobacco industry over the years (see Indicator 1, #1). Moreover, these parties were the very same parties that fought the implementation of the children without tobacco initiative in parliament during the current legislative period.

14. Retired senior government officials form part of the tobacco industry (former Prime Minister, Minister, Attorney General) (Rec 4.4)						**5**

The connections between people active in the political field and the tobacco industry are often complex and difficult to follow, as they are generally not made public. Several government officials now part of the tobacco industry, or vice versa, could be found, however.

While not a government official, Christophe Berdat, is an influential member and former general secretary of the Swiss Liberal Party (PLS), which fused to the Radical Liberal Party in 2009. He initially moved to BAT in 2002, and is Manager for Public and Regulatory Affairs at PMI since 2016.

Caroline de Buman was the former head of the secretariat of the Federal Procurement Conference (BKB/ "Sekretariat der Beschaffungskonferenz des Bundes"). The BKB is the strategic body of the Federal Administration for the areas of goods and services procurement. In particular, it performs tasks in relation to the development of federal public procurement, sustainability, policy and education. Since 2012, Caroline is a district court associate judge in the Canton of Fribourg. Since August 2018, she has been active at PMI as Senior Manager Corporate Affairs. In her LinkedIn About section, she states "For the past 15 years, I have been initiating and leading projects for associations, institutions and governments, coordinating and consolidating the interests of various stakeholders from the private and public sector."

Thomas Borer received an entry badge from National Councilor Alfred Heer, who represents SVP. Thomas Borer was previously a Swiss ambassador, and now runs a consultancy firm, with JUUL having been one of his clients.

In another example of revolving doors, a tobacco company executive was appointed to a prestigious position at one of the major Swiss universities and research centres. Since March 2021, Ursula Oesterle is the new vice-president in charge of innovation at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Contradictorily, in a 2024 RTS article exposing PMI financed research in Switzerland, an EPFL spokesperson stated that as a matter of principle, they "exclude any collaboration with the tobacco industry".

At a Cantonal level we also have Lausanne Capitale Olympique, which was formed by the City of Lausanne and the Canton of Vaud. One year after the launch of the foundation, a former BAT employee is joining the team consisting of members of the Canton of Vaud and the City of Lausanne.

The two-way revolving door system, in which politicians or government officials take up tobacco industry jobs, or vice versa, is one of many covert tactics employed by the tobacco industry in Switzerland. By employing former government officials as lobbyists, particularly ones that were well connected, the industry profits from their political networks. Moreover, they can provide key information regarding and policy initiatives and ongoing regulatory processes. Similarly, the other way around, with the government employing those previously active in the tobacco industry gives access and insights into internal governmental processes.

15. Current government officials and relatives hold positions in the tobacco business including consultancy positions. (Rec 4.5, 4.8, 4.10)						**5**

Currently there are no rules preventing parliament members from holding positions, or consulting with/for the tobacco industry. As such, the tobacco industry has a complex network reaching far into the Swiss government on a national level, including parliamentarians Gregor Rutz (salaried president of Swiss Tobacco), Alois Gmur (member of AEMP), and Fabio Regazzi (salaried president of USAM) (see Indicator 1+3).

The entrenchment of tobacco interests in Swiss political institutions is also starkly illustrated by the presence of parliamentarians in tobacco lobby groups, and in key committees that shape health and economic policy. Lobbywatch Switzerland, a non-profit association illustrates and analyses the links between council members and external companies, associations, and institutions. Research from one of their journalists revealed that up to 2024, **30 Parliamentarians have direct, or indirect links to the tobacco lobby**, including 11 from SVP, 10 from FDP, and 9 from the Centre party (see Indicator 1). Crucially, a number of these elected officials sit on two parliamentary committees most relevant to tobacco regulation: the Committee on Social Security and Health (SGK) and the Committee on Economic Affairs and Taxation (WAK). For example:

- SVP Councillor of States Hannes Germann (Schaffhausen), vice-president of the SGK, granted one of his two parliamentary access badges to a consultant who had previously lobbied on behalf of BAT Switzerland.
- SVP National Councillor Diana Gutjahr (Thurgau), also member of the SGK, sits on the board of both IG Freiheit, and the Swiss Trade Association (SGV/USAM), which houses the pro-tobacco umbrella group AEMP.
- FDP National Councillor Daniela Schneeberger (Basel-Country), a member of the WAK, serves as the salaried vice-president of the SGV since 2018, and is directly tied to the industry's lobbying apparatus (Chamber of Commerce and Industry "Gewerbekammer").
- Centre Party National Councillor Markus Ritter (St. Gallen), salaried president of the Swiss Farmers' Union and WAK member, has given a parliamentary badge to Francis Egger, secretary-general of Swiss Tabac and simultaneously deputy director at the Farmers' Union.
- Centre Party Councillor fo States Erich Ettlin (Obwalden), vice-president of WAK and member of SGK, is listed as a member of the SGV.

The overlap of these mandates demonstrates that **current government officials hold positions linked directly to the tobacco industry and their allied lobbying groups. They enjoy privileged access to the very committees responsible for drafting, reviewing, and approving health protection and taxation measures.** This represents a direct conflict of interest within the parliamentary machinery.

The consequences of such embedded influence were evident in the legislative process surrounding the Tobacco Product Act (TabPG). After the 2022 popular initiative "Yes to protecting children and young people from tobacco advertising" mandated stronger restrictions, parliament was tasked with implementing the constitutional decision through revisions of the TabPG in 2023–2024. However, during deliberations, **Councillor of State members with close links to the tobacco lobby introduced amendments that weakened the scope of advertising bans and sponsorship restrictions**.

Most notably, these amendments sought to exclude mobile sales teams at youth-accessible venues and to narrow the ban on industry sponsorship of events, despite the explicit constitutional requirement. In early 2024, both the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) and the Federal Office of Justice issued a joint legal opinion concluding that these amendments were unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Council of States adopted them, reflecting a clear case of legislative capture where industry-favoured provisions outweighed constitutional and public health obligations. Ongoing monitoring is essential.

INDICATOR 7: Preventive Measures

16. The government has put in place a procedure for disclosing the records of the interaction (such as agenda, attendees,						**5**

minutes and outcome) with the tobacco industry and its representatives. (Rec 5.1)						
Since the 2023 Swiss country report for the GTI, no progress has been made. **The Swiss government has not put any policies or programmes in place, and neither is it developing such policies or programmes.**						
17. The government has formulated, adopted or implemented a code of conduct for public officials, prescribing the standards with which they should comply in their dealings with the tobacco industry. (Rec 4.2); ***Yes – for whole of government code; Yes but partial if only MOH***						**5**
The Swiss government has neither adopted or formulated a code of conduct, prescribing standards with which they should comply when dealing with the tobacco and/or e-cigarette industry, or their representatives.						
18. The government requires the tobacco industry to periodically submit information on tobacco production, manufacture, market share, marketing expenditures, revenues and any other activity, including lobbying, philanthropy, political contributions and all other TAPS activities such as CSR or EPR (COP10), as well as on tobacco industry entities, affiliated organizations and individuals acting on their behalf, and tobacco industry funded groups and their research and marketing activities (Rec 5.2, 5.3, and COP9 and 10 Decision)						**5**
The Swiss government has no such requirement, measure and is not in the process of developing such a programme.						
19. The government has a program / system/ plan to consistently[8] raise awareness within its departments on policies relating to FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines. (Rec 1.1, 1.2)						**5**
The Swiss government has no such programme, system or plan.						
20. The government has put in place a policy to disallow the acceptance of all forms of contributions/ gifts from the tobacco industry (monetary or otherwise) including offers of assistance, policy drafts, or study visit invitations given or offered to the government, its agencies, officials and their relatives. (3.4)					**4**	

[8] For purposes of this question, "consistently" means: a. Each time the FCTC is discussed, 5.3 is explained. AND b. Whenever the opportunity arises such when the tobacco industry intervention is discovered or reported.

The Federal Law on the personnel of the Confederation forbids federal employees from demanding, receiving or accepting a promise, on their behalf or on the behalf of others, of a gift or any other advantage in the performance of their duties (art. 21 para. 4 BPG). Article 93 of the Ordinance on the Personnel of the Confederation clarifies that gifts or benefits which exceed a market value of 200 CHF are prohibited.

Any federal employees involved in a procurement or decision-making process are prohibited from accepting even minor and socially customary benefits (which do not exceed a market value of 200 CHF), if:

1. The advantage is offered by:
    a. An actual, or potential supplier, or provider
    b. A person involved in, or affected by a decision-making process, or
2. A connection between the granting of the advantage and the procurement or decision-making process cannot be excluded.

Furthermore, article 93 further states that if employees are unable to refuse a gift on the grounds of courtesy, they shall hand it over to the competent authority in accordance with Article 2. Moreover, acceptance on grounds of courtesy must be in the overall interest of the Confederation and the acceptance and any utilisation of such gifts shall be made by the competent office in accordance with article 2 for the benefit of the Swiss Confederation.

The acceptance of gifts and benefits by employees of Cantonal governments are governed by their own legislation and will be similar in nature to federal legislation. It must be noted that these rules are not applicable to members of the legislatures, such as National Councillors or Councillors of State, who can be employed by private companies or have their own businesses.

The provisions of the Swiss criminal code punishing bribery (notably article 322^{sexies}) may also apply to Parliamentarians if the advantage is provided in order that they carry out their official duties. In other words: a public official can be found guilty of accepting an advantage regardless of whether or not the person who granted the advantage can be found guilty of granting an advantage.

There are no explicit rules excluding government officials or elected representatives from accepting assistance from third parties such as draft policy documents or expert advice. Study travel falls under the acceptance of an advantage as per above.

TOTAL (Non-Party to the WHO FCTC)	**96**

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Based on COP9 and COP10 Decisions highlighting Article 5.3 recommendations

A. LIABILITY: Government has adopted or enforced mandatory penalties for the tobacco industry in case it provided false or misleading information (Rec 5.4) [5.4 Parties should impose mandatory penalties on the tobacco industry in case of the provision of false or misleading information in accordance with national law.]
Evidence Switzerland has no specific legal provisions or enforcement mechanisms in place to penalise the tobacco industry for providing false or misleading information, despite international recommendations. To date, there is no evidence of mandatory sanctions being applied against tobacco companies for misinformation, whether concerning product content, health claims or marketing narratives. A particularly concerning example is the unsubstantiated claim that e-cigarettes or heated tobacco products are "95% less harmful" than smoking. This scientifically unfounded assertion has been repeatedly used by the tobacco industry in Switzerland, including in media statements, lobbying material and stakeholder engagement, without regulatory consequences. The absence of a liability framework enables the tobacco industry to mislead policymakers, the public and even health professionals with impunity, undermining public health efforts. This is a clear gap in Switzerland's implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC and in particular Recommendation 5.4, which calls for mandatory penalties in cases of deliberate misinformation.

B. KH RESOURCE DATABASE: Government adopted and implemented measures to ensure public access to information on TI activities [5.5 Parties should adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, administrative and other measures to ensure public access, in accordance with Article 12(c) of the Convention, to a wide range of information on tobacco industry activities as relevant to the objectives of the Convention, such as in a public repository.]
Evidence Switzerland has not adopted or implemented any specific measures to ensure systematic public access to information on tobacco industry activities, as recommended under WHO FCTC Article 5.3, Recommendation 5.5. There is no centralised, accessible public repository disclosing interactions between government officials and the tobacco industry, nor any proactive transparency mechanism regarding lobbying, financial contributions, or corporate partnerships. This stands in strong contrast to other countries that have implemented best practices: • France maintains a mandatory lobbying register (HATVP), where tobacco companies must report meetings and financial expenditures. • The United Kingdom requires public officials to log and publish all meetings with external actors, including the tobacco industry. • Uruguay goes further by proactively disclosing all contacts with tobacco companies and maintains a dedicated system to monitor industry interference in public health. In Switzerland, such information remains largely invisible to the public. Lobbying is only partially regulated, and there is no legal obligation to disclose meetings with the tobacco industry or related donations. As a result, civil society and journalists lack the tools to monitor industry influence and hold actors accountable.

This absence of transparency undermines the principle of good governance and places Switzerland in clear non-compliance with Article 5.3 of the FCTC, particularly Recommendation 5.5, which calls for effective legislative or administrative action to ensure public access to relevant tobacco industry data.

Annex A: Key Tobacco Industry Actors

	TOP MULTINATIONAL TOBACCO GROUPS	MARKET SHARE	BRANDS
1	Philip Morris International (PMI)	**41%**	Marlboro, L&M, Chesterfield, Philip Morris; IQOS/TEREA (HTP)
2	British American Tobacco (BAT)	**33%**	Lucky Strike, Pall Mall, Rothmans; glo (HTP)
3	Japan Tobacco International (JTI)	**26%**	Camel, Winston, LD; Ploom (HTP)

	TOP LOCAL TOBACCO GROUPS	MARKET SHARE	BRANDS
1	**Oettinger Davidoff AG (Basel)**	n/a (not publicly disclosed for CH)	Davidoff, Zino, Avo, Camacho; premium handmade cigars
2	**Villiger Söhne AG (Pfeffikon LU)**	n/a (not publicly disclosed for CH)	Villiger (cigars/cigarillos); major machine-made producer
3	**Swiss Tobacco (Vereinigung des Schweizerischen Tabakwarenhandels)** *(trade body for wholesalers/retail)*	n/a	Represents Swiss tobacco trade (wholesale/retail)

	TOP TOBACCO INDUSTRY ALLIES/ FRONT GROUPS	TYPE *(FRONT GROUP, AFFILIATE, INDIVIDUAL)*
1	**Swiss Cigarette** (industry association of PMI, BAT, JTI)	Front/industry association
2	**AWMP – Allianz der Wirtschaft für eine massvolle Präventionspolitik**	Ally/umbrella lobbying platform

3	**JTI Switzerland "Clean-Up" partnerships, IGSU – Schweizer Kompetenzzentrum gegen Littering / Clean-Up-Day**	CSR-style ally / partnership platform
4	**Swiss Tobacco – Vereinigung des Schweizerischen Tabakwarenhandels**	Trade association (retail/wholesale), industry ally
5	**Handelsverband Schweiz (Swiss Retail Federation)** *(links with tobacco trade & AWMP)*	Business association, policy ally
6	**GastroSuisse** *(hospitality lobby frequently aligned on advertising/sales issues)*	Business association, policy ally
7	**Commission for Fairness (Schweizerische Lauterkeitskommission)** *(historic self-regulation with Swiss Cigarette/BAT/JTI/PMI)*	Self-regulatory body leveraged by industry
8	**Economiesuisse / Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (sgv)** *(AWMP hosted "c/o sgv" per Swiss Tobacco links page)*	Business umbrella, policy ally